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Abstract 
Animat AI has generally emphasised learning of a 
dispositional, or task-specific nature over that of a 
representational or task-independent kind. However, 
many animals are capable of both forms of learning, 
and, in particular, exploit representational learning to 
construct spatial knowledge that allows efficient and 
flexible navigation behaviour. The focus on building 
versatile mobile robots may therefore force the 
development of representational learning systems in 
animat AI. This paper considers the navigation problem 
and argues against the view that qualitative spatial 
representations, encoding principally topological 
relations, may necessarily be simpler to construct, store, 
or use than more quantitative models. It further argues 
against constructing a unified or global representations 
of space suggesting instead that knowledge should be 
distributed between multiple, partial, local models 
encoding complimentary constraints which can be 
combined at run-time to address a specific navigation 
task. 
1. Learning in natural systems 
Research in psychology suggests that underlying a large 
number of observable phenomena of learning and memory, 
there are two broad clusters of learning processes1.  
First, there are the dispositional learning processes 
involved in habit formation, the acquisition of motor skills, 
                                                           
1For reviews of this extensive literature see [15, 43, 46]. 
and certain forms of classical and instrumental conditioning. 
These processes involve incremental adaptation and do not 
seem to need attention or awareness. Learning is generally 
task-specific in that it is driven by a significant outcome in 
the form of a positively or negatively reinforcing event. 
Further, it does not seem to require or involve the 
acquisition of knowledge about the causal processes 
underlying the task that is solved. 
Second, there are the representational2 learning 
processes involved in acquiring knowledge about the 
relationships between events (stimuli or responses). For 
instance, that one event follows another (causal knowledge), 
or is close to another (spatial knowledge). These forms of 
learning appear to be have more of an all-or-none character, 
and may require attentional resources. They are also not 
directly involved in generating behaviour, and need not be 
acquired with respect to a specific task or desired outcome. 
The knowledge acquired can support both further learning 
or decision-making through inference.   
Lesion studies with animals and patterns of learning 
impairment in human amnesiacs indicate that in mammals 
this second style of learning relies on specific medial-
temporal structures in the brain, in particular, the 
hippocampus. In contrast the simpler associative forms of 
learning underlying habit and skill acquisition are not 
affected by damage to this brain region, but appear instead 
to be supported by neural systems that evolved much earlier. 
This view is supported by observations that all vertebrates 
                                                           
2The terms dispositional  and representational  have been 
suggested by Thomas [47] and Morris [29] to refer to these two 
clusters of learning/memory processes. 
      
and most invertebrates show dispositional learning abilities, 
whereas representational learning styles have evolved 
primarily in higher vertebrates coinciding with  increased 
brain-size.  
2. The Animat approach 
The shared interest in adaptive systems, between 
psychologists and ethologists, on the one hand, and 
Artificial Intelligence researchers and roboticists on the 
other, has recently seen the development of a new inter-
disciplinary research field. The common aim of ÔAnimatÕ 
(simulated animal) (Wilson [51]) research is to understand 
how autonomous agentsÑanimals, simulated animals, 
robots, or simulated robotsÑcan survive and adapt in their 
environments, and be successful in fulfilling needs and 
achieving goals.  
Some important themes in much of this work (see, for 
instance [28]) are as follows: control in the agent is not 
centralised but is distributed between multiple task-oriented 
modules; there is minimal reliance on internal world models 
and on reasoning or planning processes; instead there is an 
emphasis on the role of the agentÕs interaction with its 
environment in driving the selection and performance of 
appropriate, generally reflexive, behaviours; perception is 
targeted at acquiring task-relevant information rather than 
delivering a general description of the current state of the 
perceived world . 
The animat approach is thus in good accord with 
dispositional learning approaches (such as reinforcement 
learning) to the adaptation of behavioural competences. In 
view of the aim of building complete intelligent systems in 
an incremental, and bottom-up fashion this is wholly 
consistent with the earlier observation that learning in 
simpler animals is principally of a dispositional nature. 
However, the development of this research paradigm is 
already beginning to see the need for some representational 
learning. One reason for this is the emphasis on mobile 
robotics as the domain of choice for investigating animat 
AI. 
3. Navigation as a forcing domain 
The fundamental skill required by a mobile agent is the 
ability to move around in the immediate environment 
quickly and safely, this will be referred to here as local 
navigation competence. Research in animat AI has had 
considerable success in using pre-wired reactive 
competences to implement local navigation skills (e.g. [3, 
10, 45]). The robustness, fluency, and responsiveness of 
these systems have played a significant role in promoting 
the animat methodology as a means for constructing 
effective, autonomous robots. The possibility of acquiring 
adaptive local navigation competences through 
reinforcement learning has also been investigated and has 
been advanced as an appropriate mechanism for learning or 
fine-tuning such skills [31, 40].  
However, a second highly valuable form of navigation 
expertise is the ability to find and follow paths to desired 
goals outside the current visual scene. This skill will be 
referred to here as way-finding. The literature on animal 
spatial learning differentiates the way-finding skills of most 
invertebrates and lower vertebrates, from those of higher 
vertebrates (birds and mammals). In particular, it suggests 
that way-finding in most invertebrates is performed 
primarily by using path integration mechanisms and 
compass senses and secondarily by orienting to specific 
remembered stimulus patterns [49, 50][4-6]. This suggests 
that these animals do not construct models of the spatial 
layout of their environment and that consequently, their 
way-finding behaviour is relatively inflexible and restricted 
to homing or retracing familiar routes3. In contrast, higher 
vertebrates appear to construct and use representations of 
the spatial relations between locations in their environments 
(see, for example, [13, 32, 33, 35]). They are then able to 
use these models to select and follow paths to desired goals. 
This form of spatial learning is often regarded as the classic 
example of a representational learning process (e.g. [43]). 
This evidence has clear implications for research in 
animat AI. First, it suggests that systems employing 
minimal representation and reactive competences could 
support way-finding behaviour similar to that of 
invertebrates4. Second, however, the acquisition of more 
flexible way-finding skills would appear to require 
representational learning abilitiesÑthis raises the interesting 
issue of how control and learning architectures in animat AI 
should be developed to meet this need.  
4. How should space be represented? 
In keeping with the animat approach it would seem 
reasonable to require the on-line acquisition of appropriate 
                                                           
3Gould [14] has proposed a contrary view that insects do 
construct models of spatial layout however, the balance of 
evidence (cited above) appears to be against this position. 
4In particular it should be possible to exploit the good 
odometry information available to mobile robots.  
      
spatial knowledge, and the use of representations that are 
simple to construct and use, cheap to store, and support a 
Ôgraceful degradationÕ of performance when confronted 
with unreliable sensory data. What forms of representational 
learning might satisfy these criteria?  
Some recent research on robot way-finding has sought to 
address this challenge by advocating a substantial change in 
the character of the systems under investigation. 
Specifically, the emphasis of ÔclassicalÕ AI methods on 
detailed path-planning using metric models of the 
environment (e.g. [8, 11, 16, 24, 41, 48]) has been rejected 
by some researchers in favour of the use of more 
ÔqualitativeÕ methods and models (e.g. [10, 17-19, 21-23, 
25, 26, 30]). In these systems metric modelling and 
wayfinding is often regarded as supplementary to a core 
level of navigation skill based, primarily, on representations 
of topological spatial relations. This approach has, as part of 
its motivation, the perceived inadequacies of classical 
systems which are regarded as over-reliant on accurate 
sensing and detailed world models. It is suggested that such 
systems are both too ÔbrittleÕ in the face of degraded or 
missing sensory information, and too costly in terms of the 
computational and memory resources they require. 
A second motivation for investigating topological spatial 
models is research on human way-finding. Much of this 
literature follows a theory originating with Piaget [36] that 
human spatial knowledge has a hierarchical structure and is 
acquired through a stage-like process. Specifically, Piaget, 
and later Siegel and White [44], have argued that a 
fundamental stage in the acquisition of spatial knowledge is 
the construction of qualitative models of the environment 
from more elementary sensorimotor associations. This 
representation is then gradually supplemented by distance 
and direction information to form a more detailed 
quantitative map. An important element of this theory is the 
view that a primarily topological representation can support 
robust way-finding behaviour in everyday environments. 
Computational models inspired by the human way-finding 
literature have been described by Leiser [22] and by Kuipers 
[18-21]. The latter in particular has developed a number of 
robot simulations of considerable sophistication and detail 
based on the hypothesis of a hierarchical representation of 
spatial knowledge. The following extract serves to illustrate 
this theoretical position, which has been influential in other 
recent work on robot way-finding  (e.g. [23]): 
ÒThere is a natural four-level semantic hierarchy of 
descriptions of large-scale space that supports robust 
map-learning and navigation: 
1. Sensorimotor: The travellerÕs input-output 
relations with the environment. 
2.  Procedural: Learned and stored procedures defined 
in terms of sensori-motor primitives for 
accomplishing particular instances of place-finding 
and route-following tasks. 
3.  Topological:  A description of the environment in 
terms of fixed entities, such as places, paths, 
landmarks, and regions, linked by topological 
relations such as connectivity, containment and 
order. 
4.  Metric:  A description of the environment in terms 
of fixed entities [...] linked by metric relations such 
as relative distance, relative angle and absolute 
angle and distance with respect to a frame of 
reference. 
In general, although not without exception, assimilation 
of the cognitive map proceeds from the lowest level of 
the spatial semantic hierarchy to the highest, as 
resources permit. The lower levels of the cognitive map 
can be created accurately without depending greatly on 
computational resources or observational accuracy. A 
complete and accurate lower level map improves the 
interpretation of observations and the creation of higher 
levels of the map.Ó ([21], p. 26) 
In many respects this view is highly acceptable, for 
instance, the proposal that spatial knowledge is organised in 
distinct components encoding separate forms of constraint is 
a welcome contrast to the traditional approach of unitary 
global models. However, there are several implications of 
this view that are open to question. First it is important to 
ask in what sense the organisation of spatial knowledge 
should be viewed as hierarchical rather than heterarchical; 
second, to what degree global models, such as those 
described for the topological and metric levels, are required 
(as opposed to multiple overlapping local models); and 
finally, whether the emphasis on geometric content as the 
main distinguishing factor between models is correct.  
      
Some of these issues can be highlighted by contrasting 
the literature on human way-finding with much of the 
research from the wider field of animal navigation.  
In particular, this latter evidence suggests a discontinuity 
between procedural knowledge and the use of map-like 
metric spatial representations [13, 32, 33].   
For instance, in contrast to an incremental hierarchy, 
OÕKeefe [32, 33] has argued that there are two 
fundamentally independent navigation systems used by 
mammals including man. The first of these, which he calls 
the taxon system is supported by route-like chains of 
stimulus! action ! stimulus associations. Each element in 
such a chain is an association that involves approaching or 
avoiding a specific cue, or performing a body-centred action 
(generally a rotation) in response to a cue. Taxon strategies 
therefore have a similar nature to the procedural knowledge 
in the second level of Kuipers hierarchy. OÕKeefeÕs second 
system, called the locale system, is, however, a ÔtrueÕ 
mapping system in that it constructs a representational 
model describing the stimulus! stimulus  metric spatial 
relations between locations in the environment. Evidence 
for the existence of this system and its independence from 
taxon strategies consists of both observational and 
laboratory studies of animal behaviour, and 
neurophysiological studies suggesting that different brain 
structures underlie the two systems.  
Although the highest level of KuipersÕ hierarchy can be 
identified with OÕKeefeÕs locale system the former suggests 
a continuityÑwith assimilation of information onto 
ÔweakerÕ representations to generate the metric model, 
whereas the latter stresses the discontinuity and apparent 
autonomy of the two alternative mechanisms. A further 
difference is that OÕKeefeÕs theory bypasses the level of the 
topological map, if such a map exists it is as an abstraction 
from the full metric representationÑthis contrasts with 
Kuipers view in which the topological model is simpler and 
comes first.  
Gallistel [13], who provides an extensive review of 
research on animal navigation, also concludes that animals 
make considerable use of metric data for navigation. Like 
OÕKeefe he also proposes a modular and autonomous 
mapping system that stores a metric representation of spatial 
layout5. 
5. Topological and/or Metric Modelling? 
The nature of the spatial relations encoded by a world 
model determines the type of navigation behaviour that can 
be supported. Procedural (or route) knowledge can only 
support movement along segments of known paths. 
Knowledge of the topological layout of the environment 
gains the navigator the ability to identify suitable sub-goals, 
and generate and follow novel routes between locations. 
However, because this knowledge is limited to knowing the 
connectivity of places navigation is constrained to using 
known path segments between adjacent sub-goals. A 
navigator with a topological map who enters unfamiliar 
territory can explore new paths and construct new map 
knowledge but cannot engage in goal-directed movement to 
target sites. The ability to determine short-cut or straight-
line routes across un-explored terrain requires knowledge of 
higher-order spatial relations. Where such behaviours are 
observed in animals this is usually taken as strong evidence 
for the use of a metric model. That such skills would be 
very useful to an animal or robot is undeniable giving a 
strong incentive for constructing and using knowledge of 
this type.  
Given the value of metric knowledge is there a 
justification for constructing, as the first or only form of 
spatial representation, models encoding weaker geometric 
constraints? One possible argument for such a view is the 
idea that a topological model could be constructed without 
the need to detect higher-order relations. Mathematically 
topological geometry is simpler and more basic than metric 
geometryÑit requires fewer axioms. However, this 
mathematical simplicity perhaps belies the real difficulties 
of constructing topological knowledge in the absence of 
metric knowledge. I have argued elsewhere [39] that such a 
model is in general realisable only if the agent has sensory 
abilities that can be relied on to give accurate identification 
and re-identification of most locations (henceforth place 
identification), and that in practice this may require vision 
skills capable of object recognition or, at least, of very 
                                                           
5OÕKeefe and Gallistel agree on the existence of a separate 
metric mapping system but largely disagree on the relative 
importance of dead reckoning and environmental fixes in 
constructing the map. This debate will be considered further 
below. 
 
      
robust visual pattern matching6. This fits uneasily with the 
bottom-up bias of Animat AI, and, indeed, with the current 
perceptual abilities of animat-style robots. Many systems 
currently use local sonar patterns to characterise different 
places. However, this sort of local geometry information is 
not likely to be sufficiently distinctive to allow the 
disambiguation of similar places. For this reason sonar 
patterns are often supplemented by odometry information in 
order to make the place identification task feasible (e.g. 
[25]). This need to exploit metric knowledge (albeit of a 
rough and ready kind) demonstrates the difficulty of 
topological mapping with non-visual sensory data7. 
The use of some approximate metric knowledge in 
model-building introduces the possibility that such 
information might be computed and exploited in 
constructing representations, but might not actually be 
explicitly recorded or used for way-finding. Given the 
advantages that metric knowledge of any sort can endow the 
main justification for this proposal must be that the cost or 
complexity of building (or using) such representation would 
outweigh its usefulness. This supposition, which may stem 
from the perceived weaknesses of some existing metric-
based systems, may, however, be premature. A distinctive 
characteristic of much research in quantitative model-
building has been an emphasis on combining all available 
information into a unique global model. One aim of this 
paper is to suggest that it is perhaps this characteristic, 
                                                           
6Some recent work on metric-free topological map-building 
for robot navigation has recognised this need for powerful visual 
processing e.g. 
[17]
. 
7The problem of constructing a topological map are eased 
considerably by introducing additional constraints to the map-
building process. One possible constraint is to limit the behavioural 
repertoire of the robot. One way this might be achieved is to force 
the robot to maintain a travel-path that follows object boundaries 
[25, 
30] . 
This constraint of Ôwall-followingÕ limits the connectivity of the 
resulting topological graph and reduces the number of true choice 
points (i.e. vertices in the graph of degree>2).  This eases the tasks 
of segmenting the environment (into the regions that form graph 
vertices) and of place identification, and also avoids the need to 
represent places that lack distinctive local features. This approach 
has lead to some successes in building way-finding systems for 
indoor autonomous robots, however, it also has an obvious costÑ
open spaces will be poorly represented in the map and movement 
will be more rigidly limited to a small set of paths.  
rather than the use of quantitative information, that has 
contributed to the inflexibility and over-sensitivity to 
measurement error observed in some existing systems. 
6. Constructing metric models 
The task of building a representation of an environment 
that encodes distance and direction requires that places are 
located with respect to common coordinate frames. The 
coordinate frames most directly available are egocentric, 
that is, they are defined by the navigatorÕs instantaneous 
position and orientation in space. However, to construct a 
useful model, observations from different view-points must 
be integrated into representations with respect to 
environment-centred or allocentric frames. That is 
egocentric relations must be transformed to give allocentric 
spatial relations.  
The arguments that metric models are more complex or 
expensive to construct and use than more qualitative ones, 
generally concern the difficulties of obtaining accurate 
distance information (or failing that, dealing with noisy 
information), and the resource demands of the need for 
continuous transformations between egocentric and 
allocentric frames. However, there are representations and 
mechanisms that may overcome some of these objections. 
Specifically, distributed representations have been proposed 
[23, 38] in which the environment is represented using 
multiple models based on coordinate frames defined by 
distinctive local landmarks.  
 Two landmarks are sufficient to define a two-
dimensional coordinate frame (three for 3D), however, 
coordinate transformations based on such frames require 
non-linear computations (trigonometric functions and 
square-roots) and further require that an arbitrary ordering 
of the reference points is remembered in order to specify a 
unique coordinate frame. However, as Zipser [52] has 
pointed out, if a further landmark is used to define each 
local frame then all the transformation calculations become 
linear. In [38, 39] I have described a simulation based on 
this proposal in which the positions of salient goals are 
stored with respect to the two-dimensional co-ordinate 
frames8 defined by groups of three local landmarks. 
Multiple local frames are represented in a connectionist 
                                                           
8These coordinates are, strictly speaking affine rather than 
metric, however, sssuming that the agent detects metric egocentric 
spatial relation according to some calibrated Euclidean measure, 
metric relationsÑdirection and distanceÑwill be recoverable from 
a stored affine model. 
      
network in which the task of determining direction or route 
information to a desired goal is performed by a parallel, 
Ôspreading activationÕ search. The computations required to 
construct these representations from (noisy) egocentric 
metric data require only linear mathematics (indeed a simple 
ÔperceptronÕ-like learning rule will suffice) and have 
memory requirements roughly proportional to the number of 
goal-sites and landmarks stored. While following a planned 
route the system can also exploit run-time error-correction 
by incorporating egocentric fixes on sighted landmarks. 
This makes the route following system highly robust to 
noise in the representation or perceptual system. 
In contrast to approaches in which the goal is to 
construct a permanent ÔmapÕ of environmental layout (in 
which position errors are minimised or explicitly modelled) 
this approach builds no long-term static representation of 
global spatial relations. Instead the store of knowledge 
concerning a specific goal or landmark is distributed across 
a number of local models in the network allowing the 
constraint information to be combined at run-time for any 
given task. Methods for combining different constraints 
using Kalman filtering techniques are currently being 
investigated.  
7. A Ômultiple schemataÕ view 
This last section is an attempt to set out a perspective on 
the acquisition of representations of space. In contrast to 
KuipersÕ hierarchical approach in which global topological 
and metric models are constructed, it proposes a heterarchy 
of local models in which the geometric distinction is only 
one among a number of characteristics identifying 
complimentary representational forms.  Following Michael 
Arbib [1, 2], I call this a Ômultiple schemataÕ view.   
 Arbib has proposed the use of the term schemata to 
describe active representational systems or Òperceptual 
structures and programs for distributed motor controlÓ ([1] 
p. 47). In the context of constructing and using models of 
space he suggestsÑ 
ÒThe representation of [...] space in the brain is not one 
absolute space, but rather a patchwork of approximate 
spaces (partial representations) that link sensation to 
action. I mean ÔpartialÕ and ÔapproximateÕ in two 
senses: a representation will be partial because it 
represents only one small sample of space (...), and it 
will be approximate in that it will be based on an 
incomplete sample of sensory data and may be of 
limited accuracy and reliability. I will suggest that our 
behaviour is mediated by the interaction of these 
partial representations: both through their integration 
to map ever larger portions of the territory relevant to 
behaviour, and through their mutual calibration to 
yield a shared representation more reliable than that 
obtained by any one alone.Ó ([2] p. 380) 
In the specific context of cognitive maps, he also 
suggests that: 
ÒThere is no reason, in general, to expect the system to 
use Euclidean space or Cartesian coordinates for such 
a map. Rather, the system needs a whole array of local 
representations that are easily interfaced and moved 
between.Ó ([1] p. 47). 
The view advocated here is, I hope, in close accord with 
these ideas.  
Spatial information can be picked-up through multiple 
sensory modalities in a number of different guises and 
forms. This information may describe spatial relations upto 
any level of geometric richness (topologicalÑmetric) it may 
also be anywhere on a scale from precise to vague. Each 
piece of information can be viewed as supplying a potential 
constraint that can assist navigation.  
I propose that the critical distinction with regard to 
different forms of constraint information has less to do with 
the geometric content of the knowledge and more with the 
process by which that knowledge is derived. For instance, 
metric information derived from odometry is (to a large 
extent) independent from metric information determined by 
perceived distance and direction to identifiable salient 
landmarks. These two forms of quantitative knowledge thus 
provide constraints that are  complimentary because they 
derive from different sensory modalities. Multiple 
constraints can also be obtained from within a single 
sensory modality by observing different environmental cues. 
For instance, the observed position of a single distant 
landmark (such as the sun) gives a direction constraint that 
is essentially independent from spatial localisation with 
respect to local landmarks. Indeed, different individual 
landmarks or landmark groups can supply separate 
constraints as has been demonstrated in [23, 38]. Finally, 
relatively independent constraints can arise within a 
modality by reference to the same external cues but by 
employing different computational mechanisms. It is in this 
sense, perhaps, that the distinction between different 
geometries may be most relevant. For instance, the visual 
      
characteristics of landmarks might be used to construct 
knowledge of topological relations that is largely 
independent of the mechanisms that extract distance or 
direction from the visual scene.  
To the extent that different constraints are independent 
two constraints will clearly be much more powerful than 
one, three more than two, etc. It therefore seems reasonable 
to suggest that an agent should seek to detect and represent a 
number of independent or near independent constraints that 
describe the spatial relations between important places.  
The emphasis of a multiple schemata approach is not on 
constructing unified representations such as topological or 
metric maps but rather on establishing multiple 
complimentary spatial descriptions. Each schema should 
exploit a different combination of cues, channels, and 
mechanisms to instantiate a set of environmental spatial 
relations. Thus, there will overall, be a number of relatively 
distinct path-ways through which knowledge is acquired. 
This suggests a heterarchy of models (as opposed to a 
hierarchy), with some, but not all, schemata sharing 
common sources and resources. At any time an agent should 
exploit the knowledge in several schemata to support its 
current navigation task. Although some tasks may require 
the temporary creation of a unified model (drawing a 
graphical map of the environment might constitute such a 
task) in general the underlying representations can remain 
distinct allowing the reliability of each source of 
information to be assessed at run-time. 
Way-finding should exploit acquired schemata via 
arbitration procedures which decide on the basis of the 
content and accuracy of each active model the extent to 
which it should contribute to the decision process. This 
arbitration could be carried out through some fixed 
subsumption mechanism whereby, for instance, knowledge 
determined from large-scale metric relations could override 
taxon (route-following) strategies. Alternatively a more 
sophisticated system would seek to combine the constraints 
afforded by multiple schemata by weighting them according 
to their perceived accuracy or reliability. In this way, 
reliable identification of a highly distinctive landmark might 
override estimates of spatial position or orientation 
determined by some metric reckoning process. 
These ideas are currently being investigated with respect 
to the distributed coding system described in [38, 39] (and, 
briefly, above). If a specific location is encoded by two 
separate schemas based on non-overlapping landmark 
triples then these would constitute relatively independent 
constraints. To the extent that landmark sets do overlap they 
will obviously be less independent, but will nevertheless 
encode partially distinct constraint information. 
However, the idea of multiple schemata also generalises 
to encompass different coding systems. For instance, 
representations based principally on direction sense and 
odometry could be constructed which would provide a 
modality-independent source of information from the 
landmark-based coding. 
An obvious argument against a multiple schemata view 
is that acquiring and storing spatial knowledge is not 
without cost. It makes demands on attention, processing and 
memory (there are really separate costs associated with 
detecting constraints, storing them, retrieving them, and 
combining them!). One defence against this argument is the 
relative independence between different schemata which 
will allow parallel processing to be exploited to a 
considerable extent. A second possibility, which is rarely 
explored in research with artificial animats, is that the 
amount of resources devoted to a given location (i.e. the 
number of constraints stored) may vary according to the 
subjective importance of being able to relocate that place or 
reach it quickly. We could expect, for instance, that an 
animalÕs home or nest (or a robots power source) would 
have the highest priority and that therefore ÔhomingÕ might 
be the most robustly supported way-finding behaviour. 
A multiple schemata view can help in understanding the 
evolution of way-finding competence in animals, and may 
also provide support for the essentially pragmatic approach 
of Animat AI. In the case of the former, OÕKeefeÕs [32] 
separate taxon and locale systems (which follows a very 
long line of research into response vs. place knowledge in 
animal navigation, see Olton [34, 35]) can be viewed as a 
distinction along these lines. However, there also seems to 
be a reasonable case for breaking up the ÔlocaleÕ system into 
multiple schemata, for instance, models derived from 
odometry and direction senses [13, 27] and those derived 
principally from codings with respect to distinct local 
landmark groups [32]. 
In robotics this view suggests the abandonment of 
theoretical pre-conceptions about the priority, or lack of it, 
of different forms of geometric knowledge. It further 
implies that the ÔbrittlenessÕ of classical approaches arises 
not so much from the emphasis on metric modelling but 
from the search for an accurate unified metric model.  
Much existing work is compatible with this approach. In 
addition to Michael ArbibÕs work on schema theory [2] 
      
much work in psychology (e.g. [42]) and AI (e.g. [23]) 
shares similar objectives. Work in animal navigation that 
specifically fits this research theme has been performed by 
Poucet et al. (e.g. [7, 37]), Collett et al. [9] and Etienne et al. 
(e.g. [12]). To end this paper I would therefore like to draw 
upon a couple of examples from this work. 
Etienne et al. [12] report that hamsters have effective 
dead reckoning skills which are sufficient to relocate their 
nest in darkness. However, in lighted conditions hamsters 
were found to orient primarily using visual information 
about local landmarks. In conflict situations,  where a 
landmark (a single light spot) was rotated relative to the 
learned position, the hamsters homed using either the 
landmark information or their dead-reckoning sense. When 
the visual information and dead reckoning produced highly 
divergent paths dead reckoning was used, however, with 
smaller discrepancies visual information took priority over 
path integration. Etienne et al. also report that the dead-
reckoning sense was more precise when used to return to the 
nest than when used to locate a secondary feeding site. This 
suggests that a dead reckoning way-finding schema maybe 
more available for homing than for general path-finding. 
Experiments by Collett et al. [9] with gerbils suggests 
that these animals may encode goal positions (buried 
sunflower seeds) in terms of individual visible landmarks by 
using some form of direction sense. For instance, in one 
experiment gerbils were trained to locate a food cache at the 
centre of an array of two landmarks. When the distance 
between landmarks was doubled the gerbils searched at two 
sites each at the correct distance and orientation to one of 
the landmarks rather that at the centre of the two locations 
(as some theories of a landmark ÔmapÕ might predict). In a 
further experiment the gerbils were trained to go to a goal-
site at the centre of a triangle of three landmarks. During 
testing the distance of one landmark to the centre was 
doubled, Collett et al. report that the animals spent most of 
their search time around the place specified by the two 
landmarks, ignoring the one that broke the pattern. They 
interpreted this result in the following way: 
ÒThe gerbil is thus equipped with a useful procedure for 
deciding between discrepant solutions. When most of 
the landmarks agree in specifying the same goal, with 
just a few pointing to other sites, the chances are that 
the majority view is correct and that the additional 
possibilities result from mistakes in computation or 
from disturbances to the environment.Ó ([9] p. 845).  
Collett et al. are therefore suggesting that this multiple 
encoding of landmark-goal relations by hamsters occurs to 
provide the system with robustness. In other words, they 
advocate something like a multiple schemata system and 
give a clear example of the ability of such a hypothesis to 
generate interesting and testable predictions. 
8. Conclusions 
This paper has argued that the problem of representation 
for animat spatial learning may be best approached by 
discarding the goal of a complete global model of the 
environment in favour of the use of multiple, partial local 
models encoding complimentary constraints. This approach, 
I believe, has a resonance with the general ethos of animat 
research that opposes the need for representation for its own 
sake (which has often seemed to be the goal of classical AI) 
and is against a strong distinction between model and 
mechanism.  This view constitutes a theoretical position that 
has as yet only been partly explored in simulation, it is thus 
proposed as a hypothesis which awaits evaluation through 
the construction of genuine way-finding robots. 
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